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Abstract 
Despite the growing interest in dispositional reasoning as a construct and determinant of good raters (‘good 
judges’), its measurement still requires attention. We address two measurement issues in the present study. First, 
this study tests a hierarchical model as a more parsimonious account for dispositional reasoning than component- 
or general-factor models that were examined in earlier studies. So, this provides a more comprehensive test of the 
different measurement models underlying dispositional reasoning data. Second, we assess the measurement 
invariance of dispositional reasoning measure scores across two different populations of assessors that are often 
trained and used in workplace assessments, namely psychology students (N = 161) and managers (N = 160). 
Results showed that dispositional reasoning is well represented as componential in nature, with a higher-order 
construct underlying three lower-order components. A comparison of managers and psychology students through 
measurement invariance analysis showed relatively similar factor structures underlying dispositional reasoning 
scores across these groups, but metric invariance could be only partially established. 
 
  
 2 
 
 
Introduction 
The characteristics of the good raters (‘good judges’) have intrigued researchers and practitioners for a long time 
(e.g., see Funder, [17]; Taft, [44]; Vernon, [48]). Recent efforts to explain individual differences in judgment 
accuracy have shown promise for dispositional reasoning as a key determinant of what makes a good judge. 
Dispositional reasoning can be defined as a rater’s complex knowledge of traits, behaviors, and situations’ 
potential to elicit traits into manifest behaviors (Christiansen, Wolcott‐Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, [13]). 
Research (Christiansen et al., [13]; De Kock, Lievens, & Born, [16]) revealed that interviewers’ dispositional 
reasoning was the strongest predictor of accuracy among a set of individual differences that included 
demographics, personality, and general cognitive ability. Moreover, it showed discriminant validity with 
personality traits and convergence with measures of cognitive ability (rs =.43 and.68, in the two studies cited, 
respectively). 
Conceptually, dispositional reasoning has three distinguishable components: trait induction is the ability to know 
how traits manifest themselves in behavior; trait extrapolation is an understanding of how traits and their 
behavioral manifestations naturally co‐vary; and trait contextualization refers to the ability to identify situations 
that are relevant for expressing traits (De Kock et al., [16]). Importantly, each of these components is not 
measured through a self‐report questionnaire. Instead, Christiansen et al. measured these components via a 
multiple choice test in which people, for instance, have to assign adjectives to constructs (Big Five) or determine 
which situation is the best for observing specific trait‐related behavior related to constructs such as complexity or 
sociability (see also examples in Tett & Guterman, [45]). 
Despite the growing interest in dispositional reasoning as a construct and determinant of a good judge, its 
measurement still requires further attention. The measurement drawbacks of earlier studies are twofold. First, 
although Christiansen et al. ([13]) conceptualized dispositional reasoning as consisting of three components, their 
measure ‘did not permit reliable subscale scores to be computed for the hypothesized domains’ (p. 143). To 
address this issue, De Kock et al. ([16]) revised the original measure to yield reliable subscale scores and found 
that a three‐factor solution fitted the data reasonably well. However, measures of ability in the same conceptual 
domain often show both ‘positive manifold’ (Horn & Cattell, [23]) and an hierarchical nature (see Carroll, [9], for 
a review), where broad factors at a higher stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata. As dispositional reasoning 
exhibits characteristics of an ability measure (De Kock et al., [16]) it may also potentially have an hierarchical 
configuration—including a general factor influencing the three specific components. Therefore, this study tests a 
hierarchical model as a more parsimonious account for the underlying structure of dispositional reasoning scores 
than component‐ or general‐factor models that were examined in earlier studies. This provides a more 
comprehensive test of the different measurement models underlying dispositional reasoning data. 
A second measurement issue is that prior dispositional reasoning studies used two different populations of judges, 
namely either psychology students [1] (Christiansen et al., [13]; Powell & Bourdage, [37]; Powell & Goffin, [38]) 
or managers (De Kock et al., [16]). From a practice perspective, a focus on either of these two populations makes 
indeed a lot of sense because both groups constitute the typical pools of assessors that are trained and used in 
workplace assessments (Krause & Thornton, [28]; Lievens, [29]). Evidence also suggests that combining 
psychologists and managers produces the greatest predictive validity (Gaugler, Rosenthal, Thornton, & Bentson, 
[19]). However, only when the measurement structure is invariant between these two populations, dispositional 
reasoning scores can be compared and merged across these groups of assessors. Therefore, it is important to know 
whether the dispositional reasoning measure works equally well for both populations. 
These two unclear measurement features of dispositional reasoning impede progress not only on the 
aforementioned conceptual issues, but it has also practical implications for the use of the dispositional measure. 
For example, assessor training interventions may be tailored to target specific components (induction, 
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extrapolation, or contextualization) if these components are distinguishable. Moreover, lack of measurement 
invariance (MI) of dispositional reasoning scores across rater populations might require developing different 
measures for the respective groups (i.e., managers vs. psychologists). 
In short, this study aims to contribute to the small albeit growing literature on dispositional reasoning as a key 
construct by investigating its dimensionality through a more comprehensive set of confirmatory factor analysis 
models (hierarchical, component‐models, and general‐factor models). In addition, we examine the invariance of 
this measure across two samples (psychology students and managers) that are often trained in workplace 
assessments. 
 
STUDY BACKGROUND 
Dispositional reasoning: conceptualization and research 
Dispositional reasoning is defined as complex knowledge of traits, behaviors and the potential of situations to 
elicit traits into manifest behaviors (for a recent discussion, see De Kock et al., [16]). Dispositional reasoning may 
allow good judges to process behavioral information toward accurate trait inferences. Research (Christiansen et 
al., [13]; De Kock et al., [16]) showed that interviewers’ dispositional reasoning was the strongest predictor of 
accuracy among a set of individual differences that included demographics, personality, and general cognitive 
ability. In both these studies, participants watched videotaped segments of individuals responding to employment 
interview questions and judged the characteristics of the video interviewees. Accuracy was measured by 
comparing raters’ judgments with those of ‘true scores,’ which were derived from targets’ self‐reported 
personality dimensions (Christiansen et al., [13] ), or subject matter expert ratings of interviewees’ performance 
(De Kock et al., [16]). Moreover, dispositional reasoning scores showed discriminant validity with personality 
traits and convergence with measures of cognitive ability (rs =.43 and.68, in the two studies cited, respectively). 
Finally, in one of these studies (De Kock et al., [16]) dispositional reasoning showed incremental validity 
(ΔR2 = .09, p = .004; small to medium effect size, Cohen’s f2 = .11) over general mental ability to predict a key 
accuracy criterion (Borman’s Differential Accuracy scores). As such, these findings speak for the practical use of 
dispositional reasoning measures to screen and select assessors in organizations. Other research investigated 
whether it is possible to develop assessors’ dispositional reasoning through training. Early attempts (Powell & 
Bourdage, [37]; Powell & Goffin, [38]) to enhance one of the components of dispositional reasoning—so‐called 
behavior‐trait knowledge, also known as ‘induction’ (De Kock et al., [16])—with training, have been 
unsuccessful, however. 
 
Competing models of dispositional reasoning 
Christiansen et al. ([13]) conceptualized dispositional reasoning as consisting of three components. However, 
their subscales of the different components were too short to provide reliable subscale scores. So, they assumed a 
general‐factor model. De Kock et al. ([ 16]) extended the original measure to yield reliable subscale scores and 
found that a three‐factor solution (component‐model) fitted the data reasonably well. Apart from testing these 
models, this study tests for the first time also an hierarchical model as a more parsimonious account for 
dispositional reasoning than the component‐ or general‐factor models that were examined in earlier studies. 
 
  
 4 
 
 
Model 1: General‐factor model 
In a general‐factor model underlying dispositional reasoning scores (see Figure 1), assessors’ procedural and 
declarative knowledge structures that relate to multiple domains—in this case, the areas of knowledge of 
behaviors, traits, and situations—are encapsulated in a single broad factor. For example, items that measure one 
component (e.g., trait induction) overlap with items that tap into another (e.g., trait extrapolation), resulting in a 
broad dispositional reasoning latent variable that causes variance in all items, irrespective of the component that a 
specific item was designed to measure. Therefore, the model assumes no distinction between separate 
dispositional reasoning components. 
In the broader literature, a well‐known example of a general‐factor model is Spearman’s ([42]) ‘g‐theory’, that is, 
the view that performance at one type of cognitive task tends to be comparable to performance at other cognitive 
tasks. General‐factor models also exist in other literatures such as general affectivity (Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & 
Reb, [15]). 
 
Figure 1: A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: A general-factor model 
(Model M1). Only nine indicator variables are used in this example, as demonstration 
 
 
Model 2: Three components (First order) 
In a component‐model of dispositional reasoning, specific abilities related to understanding traits, behaviors, and 
situations cluster into three facets. So, in such a model, dispositional reasoning has three distinguishable 
components: trait induction is the ability to know how traits manifest themselves in behavior; trait extrapolation is 
an understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally co‐vary; and trait contextualization 
refers to the ability to identify situations that are relevant for expressing traits. In a component‐model (see Figure 
2), items load onto these three separate dimensions, with no cross‐loadings allowed. 
Componential views of constructs are also encountered in the psychology literature. Examples of componential 
models can be found for emotional intelligence (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, [35]) and for other ‘specific’ 
intelligences (Gardner, [18]). 
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Figure 2: A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: A three-component (first-
order) model (M2). Only nine indicator variables are used in this example, as demonstration 
 
 
 
Model 3: Hierarchical model (Second order) 
Dispositional reasoning can also be considered a hierarchically ordered construct, with a general factor 
influencing the three specific components (see Figure 3). An hierarchical structure for dispositional reasoning 
suggests a broad dispositional reasoning latent construct (i.e., higher‐order factor) causing variance in the three 
specific components (i.e., lower‐order factors). 
In the broader literature, measures of ability in the same conceptual domain often show an hierarchical nature (see 
Carroll, [9] , for a review). For instance, in the intelligence literature, the early general (g) versus specific (sn) 
intelligence debate has given way to a consensus view of the hierarchical nature of abilities where broad factors at 
a higher stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata. 
Figure 3: A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of dispositional reasoning: Hierarchical (second-order) 
model (Model M3). Only nine indicator variables are used in this example, as demonstration 
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Rater groups and MI 
As noted above, prior dispositional reasoning studies used two different populations of assessors, namely either 
psychology students (Christiansen et al., [13]; Powell & Bourdage, [37]; Powell & Goffin, [38]) or managers (De 
Kock et al., [16]). Both of these groups constitute the pools of assessors that are often trained and used in 
workplace assessments (Krause & Thornton, [28]; Lievens, [29]). In support of this point, a survey of AC 
selection and development programs of 144 organizations in 18 countries (Thornton & Krause, [46]) reported that 
70% used line managers, whereas external (44%) or internal (22%) psychologists were also a popular choice. 
Previous studies also found some rating differences between these two populations. For example, Barr and Hitt ([ 
2]) examined the selection decisions of professional interviewers and students and found significant differences in 
the number and nature of factors used. In several studies, Lievens ([ 29] , [30] , [31]) found that psychology 
students were better able to provide distinct assessment center ratings than managers. Lievens attributed these 
findings on psychology students’ education that had versed them more into the notion of psychological constructs 
and their behavioral indicators. 
Although these prior studies hint that a dispositional reasoning measure might work differently for psychology 
students and managers, no earlier studies have considered the MI of dispositional reasoning across both of these 
groups. MI (Millsap, [36]) determines whether ‘an assessment instrument is measuring the same constructs in 
exactly the same way across groups’ (Byrne & Stewart, [8] , p. 287). Without invariance between managers and 
psychology students, between‐group comparisons of test scores may be misleading: that is, we would not be sure 
if observed group differences are ‘real’ or confounded with differences in the structure of the constructs and/or 
functioning of the measurement scales (Cheung, [11]). Only when the measurement structure is invariant between 
these two populations, dispositional reasoning scores can be compared across these assessor groups. 
 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
Combined sample 
For our study, it was important to limit the sample to participants that form part of a broader population of 
potential assessors. Therefore, a combined sample (N = 321) of managers (49.8%) and psychology students 
(50.2%) was selected because these are the people who are most likely to be trained as assessors (Krause & 
Thornton, [28]). The combined sample (54.4% females and 45.6% males) comprised 46.3% Black African, 35.8% 
White, 11.1% Mixed Race, and 5.9% Asian/Indian participants. Their mean age was 32.72 (SD = 11.13) years. 
English was the official workplace language of all participants, although the prevalent first languages among 
these respondents were English (40.8%) and Afrikaans (19%). 
 
Group 1: Psychology students 
We recruited 161 students in Industrial‐Organizational Psychology from two universities in South Africa. 
Students were at various levels of academic seniority, although most (59.5%) were postgraduates (i.e., they had 
finished their Bachelor’s degrees and were doing Honors‐ or Masters‐degrees at the time of the study). The rest 
were Bachelor’s students. 
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Group 2: Managers 
Our second group consisted of 160 managerial personnel [2] working in various line and staff functions (e.g., 
HRM, finance, etc.) within two organizations: a national police training academy and a supervisor training 
college. All of these respondents were undergoing staff development training when they were assessed. 
A comparison of the two samples showed that managers were generally older (M = 42.3 years, SD = 6.7 years) 
than psychology students (M = 22.8 years, SD = 3.5 years), t(221.02) = 31.142, p < .001. The samples differed in 
terms of ethnic composition, as managers were predominantly African (71.4%), as compared to students whom 
were mostly White (55.6%). 
 
Procedure 
The data collection was completed in multiple sessions within the respective organizations. After introducing the 
research as part of assessor training to develop self‐insight about their dispositional reasoning, we explained 
participants’ rights and requested their informed consent. Next, participants independently completed the research 
questionnaire, before they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. Following their study participation, 
assessors each received an individual feedback report summarizing their performance on the measure. 
 
Measures 
Dispositional reasoning 
To measure the dispositional reasoning components, we used the Revised Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (R‐
IJI) (De Kock et al., [16])—a revision of the original IJI (Christiansen et al., [13]). The Revised IJI consisted of 64 
items that measure three components. Example items for each subscale may be found in Appendix A. 
 
Induction 
The induction component of dispositional reasoning was measured by 20 items that tapped candidates’ ability to 
make correct behavior‐trait inferences. After describing the Big Five personality traits, a list of adjectives from 
Goldberg’s ([ 20]) factor markers were presented. The task was to identify the traits (e.g., conscientiousness) that 
best matched the marker adjectives (e.g., thorough). 
 
Extrapolation 
The extrapolation component of dispositional reasoning was measured by 23 items assessing a respondent’s 
understanding of how traits and behaviors co‐occur. Items described a fictional person in terms of traits and 
behaviors and required respondents to select which of four descriptions was most (or least) likely also true of the 
person. 
 
  
 8 
 
 
Contextualization 
The contextualization component of dispositional reasoning was measured by 21 items that test understanding of 
trait–situation relevance. On the basis of empirical results from an earlier study (Tett & Guterman, [45]) one 
response option for each item was keyed as being the most consistent with empirical evidence, theoretical 
relationships, and expert judgment. One subset of items presented a trait description, for instance ‘empathy,’ by 
listing examples of behaviors associated with high and low scorers on the trait. Next, respondents had to choose 
which of five situations would most likely elicit the relevant behavior. 
 
Biographical characteristics 
To enable normative comparisons, we also requested respondents’ biographical details. 
 
Statistical analysis 
To evaluate the latent structure of the revised dispositional reasoning measure, we conducted both lower‐order 
and higher‐order confirmatory factor analysis (HCFA). First‐order CFA was used to assess the measurement 
model fit of both the global factor (M1) and three‐component (M2) models. Consequently, HCFA was used to 
evaluate the higher‐order model (M3). Hierarchical factor analysis is often used when it is posited that specialized 
facets of intelligence (e.g., verbal reasoning, memory) are influenced by a broader dimension of intelligence (g). 
In higher‐order factor analysis, the factor correlations at a lower level (i.e., between specialized facets of a broader 
construct) become the input matrix for the higher‐order factor analysis. The HCFA attempts to provide a more 
parsimonious account for the inter‐correlations among lower‐order factors (Brown, [4]). 
 
Robust maximum likelihood estimation was employed to estimate all models, unless stated otherwise. We used a 
number of fit indices to evaluate model fit, including SBχ2(Satorra & Bentler, [41]), CFI, RMSEA (and its 90% 
confidence intervals), and SRMR. As recommended by Byrne and Stewart ([8]), the following minimum cutoffs 
were applied to infer acceptable model fit: SBχ2 (Satorra & Bentler, [41]) with p >.05; CFI > .95; RMSEA < .08; 
and SRMR < .08. Our analyses were conducted with Lisrel 9.2 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, [25]). 
 
 
Data preparation for HCFA 
Before we conducted the HCFA, we addressed a number of statistical issues. 
 
Item‐to‐sample size ratio 
Our complete measure had 64 individual items. We decided not to conduct HCFA of the full measurement model 
on item‐level data in this study because the number of parameters to be estimated in a model with 64 observed 
variables—one for each item—would have led to inadequate statistical power (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 
[34]; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, [50]). Therefore, we reduced the number of items in the scales to allow 
for sufficient power and ensure appropriate model identification—issues that were important for the subsequent 
hierarchical model analyses. Upon inspection of the issues associated with reducing the number of items in the 
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scales (see Yang, Nay, & Hoyle, [51]) we decided to create four indicator variables for each first‐order latent 
variable by using parcels of items within each scale as manifest variables, using the procedures outlined by Little, 
Cunningham, Shahar, and Widaman ([ 32]). Our parceling strategy is explained in Appendix B. Using parcels in 
CFA has distinct advantages: Not only do they allow retaining measurement information from many items, but in 
most conditions, less biased parameter estimates result when parcels are used (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 
[21]). However, we acknowledge that combining items into parcels may also artificially enhance the reliability 
estimates of scores from the measure (Hair et al., [21] ). 
 
Model specification 
The hierarchical CFA model (see Figure 1) hypothesizes for both managers and psychology students the 
following (in line with Byrne and Stewart, [8] ): (a) a dispositional reasoning structure is best represented by a 
single higher‐order factor of dispositional reasoning and three lower‐order factors (trait induction, trait 
extrapolation, and trait contextualization); (b) each observed variable (i.e., parcel) has a non‐zero loading on the 
lower‐order factor it was intended to measure and zero loadings on other factors (i.e., zero cross‐loadings); (c) 
covariation among the three lower‐order factors is explained by the higher‐order factor of dispositional reasoning; 
(d) measurement error terms are uncorrelated; and (e) factor disturbances are uncorrelated. 
 
Model identification 
To identify a hierarchical CFA model, it must have at least three first‐order factors, and the latter should have at 
least two indicators each (Kline, [27]). The hierarchical model (M3) that we hypothesized (see Figure 3) satisfies 
both these requirements: Our model has three first‐order factors and five indicator variables for each first‐order 
factor. However, the second‐order portion of the model must also be identified in itself. As a solution that 
specifies a single second‐order factor over three first‐order factors is just‐identified (Brown, [4]), the residuals of 
induction and extrapolation were constrained to be equal (using a procedure outlined by Byrne, [7]) to achieve 
identification at the higher‐order level of the model. 
 
Latent variable scaling 
In addition to adequate model identification, it was necessary to scale the second‐order factor of dispositional 
reasoning in the model because it has no observed measures and must be provided a metric (Brown, [4]). We 
decided to fix the variance of the second‐order dispositional reasoning factor to 1.0 because it left all three direct 
effects of dispositional reasoning on the first‐order factors as free parameters. 
 
Higher‐order CFA procedure 
After completing the data preparation, we followed the general sequence of HCFA proposed by Brown ([ 4] ), 
which was to: (a) develop a ‘well‐behaved’ first‐order CFA solution, in other words, one that fits well and is 
conceptually valid; (b) examine the magnitude and pattern of correlations among factors in the first‐order model; 
and (c) fit the second‐order model, based on conceptual and empirical grounds. 
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Measurement invariance 
Finally, we conducted MI analysis (Millsap, [36]) of the best fitting factor model between managers and 
psychology student samples. To establish the MI of the first‐order models of the factor structure underlying our 
measure of dispositional reasoning, between managers and psychology students, we followed available guidelines 
for general MI (e.g., Brown, [4]; Millsap, [36]; Raykov, Marcoulides, & Li, [39]; Vandenberg & Lance, [47] ), 
but also specific guidelines to assess invariance of hierarchical models (e.g., Byrne & Stewart, [8]; Chen, Sousa, 
& West, [10]; Cheung, [11]). Our testing strategy involved hierarchical steps comparing the fit of a series of more 
constrained models with less constrained models, relying on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
[43]) at each step. The LR test involves a comparison of the χ2‐values of the unconstrained and constrained 
models and statistically significant increase in χ2 as a result of constraining a specific set of parameters was used 
as a criterion for rejecting MI. 
 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 and Figure 4 portray the mean dispositional reasoning scores (overall, and by component) for managers 
and psychology students. Results from an independent samples t test indicated that psychology students (M = .76, 
SD = .10, N = 161) scored higher on overall dispositional reasoning than managers (M = .45, SD = .14, N = 160), 
t(287.8) = −22.2, p < .001, two‐tailed. The difference of.31 scale points was substantial (scale range: 0%–100%; 
d = 2.55, large effect size r =.79, Cohen, 1988) and the 95% confidence interval around the difference between the 
group means was relatively precise (33.7–28.2). As a possible reason, psychology students’ education might verse 
them more into the notion of psychological constructs and their behavioral indicators (Lievens, [29]). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for the managers’ and psychology‐students’ samplesa 
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For the sake of brevity, the mean differences across the two subsamples for component scores are not reported; 
however, they were all statistically significant, p < .001. Table 1 also reports the intercorrelation (uncorrected for 
unreliability) between the dispositional reasoning component scores for the two subsamples. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of mean scores (%) for dispositional reasoning and its components (induction, 
extrapolation, and contextualization) between managers and psychology students. The y axis is interpreted as 
follows: 0%5no correct answers and 100%5all items correct 
 
Assessment of models 
General‐factor model (M1) 
Model assessment was conducted by testing a series of confirmatory factor analytic models. The results of these 
tests are reported in Table 2 for the combined sample. Table 3 reports the results separately for managers and 
psychology students. The general‐factor model (M1, see Figure 3) of dispositional reasoning was assessed by a 
first‐order confirmatory factor analysis based on data from the combined sample. The fifteen item parcels serve as 
indicators of the general dispositional reasoning factor. The general‐factor model (M1) was tested and the fit was 
acceptable, χ2(90, N = 321) = 191.50, p <.001, Satorra–Bentler χ2 (90, N = 321) = 180.99, p < .001, Robust 
CFI = .96, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI: [0.05; 0.07], although the relative large chi‐square statistic 
suggested the need for further model improvement.  
Table 2: Fit indices for factor structure models of dispositional reasoning measure in combined samplea 
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Table 3: Sample comparison of fit indices for alternative factor structure models of dispositional reasoning 
 
 
Three‐component model (M2) 
Next, we evaluated a three‐component factor model, with trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait induction as 
separate components (see Figure 2). The three factors were hypothesized to co‐vary with one another and the 
respective item parcels created from each of the subscale items serve as indicators of the respective factors. A 
three‐component model showed relatively good fit, χ2(87, N = 321) = 117.60, p =.016, Satorra–Bentler χ2 (87, 
N = 321) = 113.29, p < .05, Robust CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. All fifteen item 
parcels (three first‐order latent variables with five item parcels each) were significant indicators of their respective 
latent factors. We inspected the results of the phi matrix providing the correlations among the latent variables (or 
factors) and consistent with our expectation, all factors were significantly interrelated (range of zs = 6.76–10.48). 
Factor intercorrelations (among the various subdimensions of the dispositional reasoning components, M2) were 
generally large (.84 < φ < .95). So, the pattern of correlations speaks to the feasibility of the suggested second‐
order model (which posited that trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait contextualization are more specific 
dimensions of broad underlying dispositional reasoning). 
 
Hierarchical factor model (M3) 
Finally, a hierarchical (second‐order) factor model of dispositional reasoning—this model proposes a general 
component, influencing the three specific components of induction, extrapolation, and contextualization—was 
tested and support was found because the model showed good fit, χ2 (87, N = 321) = 117.60, p =.016, Satorra–
Bentler χ2 (87, N = 321) = 113.29, p < .05, Robust CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. 
Despite being just‐identified, the magnitude and statistical significance of the factor loadings in the higher‐order 
part of the model may be meaningfully interpreted (Brown, [4]). Looking at our results (the completely 
standardized estimates from the solution), each of the first‐order factors loads strongly on the second‐order 
dispositional reasoning factor: induction (γ = .98) and extrapolation (γ = .96) loaded more strongly than 
contextualization (γ = .88). As such, dispositional reasoning as a higher‐order factor accounted for substantial 
proportions of variance in the individual components: induction 96% (1 − .04), extrapolation 91.5% (1 − .085), 
and contextualization 77.1% (1 − .229). 
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Table 4: Tests of invariance of dispositional reasoning in managers and psychology-students 
 
Model comparison 
We compared the baseline model (general‐factor model, M1) with the comparison models. A chi‐square 
difference test (Bryant & Satorra, [5], [6]) indicated that the nested model (M2) showed significantly poorer fit 
compared to the baseline (M1) general‐factor model, Satorra–Bentler χ2diff(3, N = 321) = 45.033, p < .001. 
Therefore, the three‐component model of dispositional reasoning fitted significantly better than a general‐factor 
model. 
 
We also compared a model in which the correlations between dispositional reasoning were freely estimated; and a 
nested comparison model in which the correlations were constrained to be unity.[ 3] We used the raw data as 
input for the analysis and found relatively poor fit of the nested model, χ2 (90, N = 321) = 189.843, p < .01, 
RMSEA = .06 (90% CI:.04;.07). A chi‐square difference test indicated that the nested model (specifying the 
relationship between dispositional reasoning facets as perfectly correlated) showed significantly poorer fit, 
compared to the baseline model, χ2diff(3, N = 321) = 72.303, p < .001. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
components are empirically distinct from one another. 
The goodness‐of‐fit of the hierarchical model (M3) is the same as the three‐component first‐order model (M2) in 
which factors are allowed to co‐vary freely. According to Brown ([ 4] ), this is because a solution that specifies a 
single second‐order factor over three first‐order factors is just‐identified (Brown, [4]) and, therefore, it is not 
appropriate to statistically compare M3 with M2. Only when the higher‐order model is over‐identified, can the 
nested χ2 be used to determine whether the specification in M3 produces a significant degradation in fit relative to 
the first‐order solution. 
However, apart from the higher‐order solution not resulting in a decrease in model fit, it also provides a more 
parsimonious account for the correlations among the first‐order factors. So, a higher‐order model with 
dispositional reasoning as a general factor in turn influencing induction, extrapolation, and contextualization, 
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explains variance in test scores better than a general‐factor model. The model fit strategy outlined above (for 
testing M1, M2, and M3) was repeated in each separate subsample and the results are reported in Table 3. 
 
Measurement invariance 
To compare the factor structure of dispositional reasoning between managers and psychology students, we 
conducted MI analyses (see Table 4). In line with the suggestions of Brown ([4]), a baseline model was first 
established in each group, followed by tests of equivalence across groups at each of several increasingly stringent 
levels of invariance. 
Table 4: Tests of invariance of dispositional reasoning in managers and psychology‐students 
 
 
First‐order (M2) invariance 
Preliminary analyses 
It is preferable to conduct multiple‐groups CFA with relatively balanced sample sizes, as was the case in the 
present study (managers: N = 160; students: N = 161). The Robust ML estimator was used in estimation of all 
models and, therefore, all analyses are based on the Satorra–Bentler scaled statistic (SBχ2; Satorra & Bentler, 
[41]). To evaluate all models we relied on SBχ2, as well as on CFI, the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), and SRMR, in line with the recommendations of Byrne and Stewart ([ 8]). The evaluation criteria we 
apply for each fit index are outlined in Byrne and Stewart ([8]): Values that adhere to the following cutoffs 
indicate significant reduction in fit when comparing two nested models: (a) if corrected ΔSBχ2/Δdf shows 
statistical significance; (b) ΔCFI >.01; and (c) the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) > .08. The 
first item parcel within each subscale was used as a marker indicator to define the metric of the latent variable. 
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Testing for baseline models 
As the estimation of baseline models involves no between‐group constraints, the data were analyzed separately 
for each group. Prior to conducting the multiple‐groups CFA, we ensured that the suggested three‐factor model is 
acceptable in both groups. As shown in Table 4, overall fit statistics for the three‐factor solution are consistent 
with good model fit in both managers and psychology students. On both groups, all freely estimated factor 
loadings are statistically significant (all ps <.01). 
 
Testing for configural invariance 
Configural invariance represents the observance of the same number of factors and factor loading pattern across 
groups—no parameter equality constraints are imposed. For this model, as with subsequent tests in our invariance 
analysis where equality constraints are imposed on particular parameters, data for the two groups are analyzed 
simultaneously in a file combining data for both groups to obtain estimates. Given that the baseline models are 
now fitted simultaneously in a multigroup evaluation, the criterion for configural invariance is that goodness‐of‐fit 
should indicate a well‐fitting model. So, we conducted the simultaneous analysis of equal form. As shown in 
Table 4, this solution provides an acceptable fit to the data. This solution (i.e., configural model) serves as the 
baseline model for subsequent tests of MI and population heterogeneity. 
 
Testing for factor loading invariance 
In this step, equality constraints are imposed for all freely estimated first‐order factor loadings (except for three 
items fixed to 1.00 for the purposes of latent variable scaling). Invariance for this step holds if goodness‐of‐fit is 
adequate and if there is minimal degradation in fit from the configural model. The analysis evaluates whether 
factor loadings (unstandardized) of the dispositional reasoning component indicators are equivalent in managers 
and psychology students. In our data, the equal factor loadings models had an overall good fit to the data, 
although it significantly degraded fit relative to the equal form solution, χ2diff(12) = 39.60, p < .001. As this value 
is statistically significant, it follows that the constraints of equal factor loadings in the restricted model do not hold 
(Byrne & Stewart, [8]), suggesting that the two models are not equivalent across the manager and psychology 
student groups. As the constraint of equal factor loadings significantly degrades the fit of the solution, it can be 
concluded that the indicators do not evidence comparable relationships to the latent constructs of dispositional 
reasoning components in managers and psychology students (Brown, [4]). This means that a unit change in the 
underlying latent variable is not associated with statistically equivalent change in the observed measures (item 
parcels [4]) in both groups. 
A closer look at the factor loadings revealed that the mean factor loading for managers was.57 (SD = .12) and for 
psychology students.48 (SD = .13). Of these, 80% were invariant (within 1.96 SD). The three loadings that were 
not invariant (> 1.96 SD) were equally spread across components. A failure to demonstrate metric invariance (i.e., 
factor loadings are not equivalent across the two groups) was sufficient evidence to terminate the evaluation of 
further constraints. The results of further tests are reported in Table 4, however. Overall, from these results we 
conclude that only partial MI (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989) between managers and psychology students 
exists for our measure. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study contributes to the small albeit growing literature on dispositional reasoning as a key construct by 
investigating its dimensionality through a more comprehensive set of confirmatory factor analysis models 
(hierarchical, component models, and general‐factor models). In addition, we test the invariance of this measure 
across two samples (psychology students and managers) that are often trained in workplace assessments. 
Results supported an hierarchically configured model for dispositional reasoning, with a general factor at a higher 
stratum driving three specific facets (trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait contextualization) at a lower 
stratum. Moreover, the hierarchical model showed acceptable fit within both our psychology students and 
manager samples. So, we found evidence for a relatively common factor structure for dispositional reasoning in 
both samples. However, we also observed some lack of metric invariance for the dispositional reasoning measure 
between managers and students, in other words, the factor loadings were overall not equivalent between managers 
and students. 
Follow‐up analyses showed that only three (20%) observed variables showed substantial differences in factor 
loadings between the two groups. It is possible that our invariance tests were conservative in the sense that a 
minority of observed variables, with large (> 1.96 SD) differences in factor loadings between groups, led to 
failure of the overall test for metric invariance. We also considered the location of the noninvariant items within 
the component measures: The ‘offending’ observed variables were not located within particular dispositional 
reasoning components, but rather, they were evenly spread. Moreover, the item content of the non‐invariant 
observed variables did not reveal any clear pattern that may have provided a theoretical explanation for the 
differences in factor loadings between managers in psychology students. Regarding the overall strength of factor 
loadings between the two groups, the mean factor loading (across items) for managers (.57) was higher than 
psychology students (.48), which may have contributed to the failure in the invariance test. The overall lower 
factor loading of the student group may have resulted, in part, from the relatively lower dispersion in their item 
responses, that is, students showed lower variability than managers and they did better overall on the measure. 
Descriptive statistics showed that psychology students outperformed managers on the measure of dispositional 
reasoning by a substantial margin. As noted, earlier studies revealed also other differences between managers and 
psychology students. For example, prior studies reported that psychology students were better able to provide 
distinct assessment center ratings than managers (Lievens, [29], [30], [31]) and differed from managers in the 
number and nature of factors they used for selection decisions (Barr & Hitt, [2]). One interpretation is that—as 
compared to managers—psychology students may have better developed schemas that relate to understanding 
traits, behaviors, and situations, by virtue of their education and professional training. However, it is important to 
qualify these explanations because metric equivalence is required to make meaningful between group 
comparisons of the respective scores. Without metric equivalence, mean differences in scores between these 
groups cannot be unambiguously interpreted, because it is unclear whether score differences are due to actual 
differences in this ability (i.e., the schema‐based explanation mentioned above), or to different psychometric 
responses to the scale items (Cheung & Rensvold, [12]). 
This study has several limitations. First, by grouping assessors into two relatively coarse categories (managers vs. 
psychology students) it may obscure other important individual differences within these groups, such as gender 
and ethnicity. More research is needed to see how stable are the reported factor solutions for dispositional 
reasoning between gender and ethnic groups. Second, the modest sample sizes that we used prohibited fitting our 
models using item‐level data. Given the potential limitations of item parceling as a strategy (Little et al., [32]) we 
also fitted the measurement models first at the item level in the combined sample. In addition, we tested the effect 
of different parceling strategies on the study’s final results—the choice of parceling strategy did not change the 
substantive conclusions. Third, we did not include psychologists in our study, although psychologists are also an 
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important group of assessors in practice (Krause & Thornton, [28]). Future studies should investigate the 
measurement properties of our dispositional reasoning measure in a sample of psychologists. 
In terms of future research, we see the following avenues. First, studies should consider the measurement of 
dispositional reasoning across different cultures. Our measure is based on the Big Five personality framework. 
Although this framework is relatively universal, personality traits may be expressed in unique ways across 
cultures (Church, [14]; Heine & Buchtel, [22]). Moreover, people from different cultures may have idiosyncratic 
interpretations of the same observed behavior and how it clusters into constructs (Willmann, Feldt, & Amelang, 
[49]). As such, cultural groups may score differently on a common set of items that tap into knowledge and 
understanding of trait concepts. They may have different psychometric responses to the scale items (Cheung & 
Rensvold, [12]). So, we recommend that future studies consider MI and mean differences between different 
cultural groups. 
Another issue for future studies is to further evaluate the discriminant validity of our dispositional reasoning 
measure, to show that it is distinct from general mental ability and other abilities (spatial, analytical, problem‐
solving, etc.) and personality (attention to detail, empathy, emotional intelligence, etc.) that are often used in 
‘good judge’ studies. 
Finally, a fruitful avenue is to consider whether or not dispositional reasoning is independent of the trait or 
content being assessed. Dispositional reasoning may be understood broadly as the ability to reason about traits 
and dispositions. Our measure (as with the measure of Christiansen et al., [13]) was ‘cast in the mold’ of the Big 
Five personality framework. This typology was a good place to start because it is an overarching framework that 
is generally accepted. However, in principle we could develop a test that measures people’s knowledge about any 
dispositions, just like with tests of general mental ability different stimulus material can be used in different sets 
of items. Therefore, measures can be developed also for other referent constructs (e.g., interview dimensions, see 
Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, & Stone, [24]). 
Our findings suggest some implications for practice. As noted, measures of dispositional reasoning may be useful 
for both groups because they represent the pools of assessors that are often trained in workplace assessments 
(Krause & Thornton, [28]; Lievens, [29]). In our analyses, an hierarchical model with three components showed 
the best fit, suggesting that organizations may develop assessor training interventions to target specific 
components (induction, extrapolation, or contextualization) and they might report both an overall dispositional 
reasoning score, as well as subscores for the three components. Moreover, lack of MI suggests that some 
adjustments to the dispositional reasoning measure might be needed according to the respective group (i.e., 
managers vs. psychology students). 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE ITEMS FROM THE DISPOSITIONAL REASONING TEST 
Trait induction 
Circle the letter that corresponds most to the trait you think is represented by the word: 
 
Trait 
Behavior Emotional stability Extraversion Openness Agreeableness Conscientiousness 
Sloppy           X 
Irritable X     
 
Trait extrapolation 
For example, one item depicted ‘John’ as ‘John’s coworkers all describe him as efficient, thorough, and 
persistent. MOST likely John also:’. Next, respondents had to choose the best answer from the following options: 
 
A. feels the need to be around lot of people, 
B. has a great deal of sympathy for those less fortunate, 
C. doesn’t often give in to his impulses, 
D. enjoys fantasizing and daydreaming. 
 
Clearly, only option (C), ‘doesn’t often give in to his impulses’ relates to the focal trait (conscientiousness) in the 
original person description. 
 
Trait contextualization 
For example, one item stated ‘Which of the following situations is most relevant to the trait of organization?’. 
Then, respondents had to select the most appropriate answer from three options (correct answer in bold): 
 
A. You are busy with a task and people continuously interrupt you 
B. On your way home you drive past a broken down vehicle 
C. Over the last 2 years, you have been employed at a job that entails working by yourself. Your boss offers 
you a chance to do essentially the same thing, but in a group of coworkers 
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APPENDIX B: PARCELING STRATEGY: DIMENSIONALITY CONSIDERATIONS 
An appropriate parceling strategy should be identified given the dimensionality of the factor structure underlying 
a set of item scores. Exploratory factor analysis of our item‐level data (using Principal Axis Factoring, with 
Oblimin rotation, considered appropriate for our data, as suggested by Tabachnick & Fidell, [43]) indicated 
possible multidimensionality within all three first‐order factors, namely for induction, extrapolation, and 
contextualization. However, we also had to consider the possibility that multidimensionality within each 
component of dispositional reasoning may be due to statistical artifacts. For example, multiple dimensions may 
also be artificially created when items vary in terms of their difficulty levels. Even if various items measure the 
same construct, the resulting correlation coefficients between these items may be low if the response thresholds 
vary much (Lord & Novick, [33]). As a result, techniques that are based on correlations, such as factor analysis, 
may cause artifacts in the form of spurious ‘difficulty factors’ with little if any psychological meaning (Bernstein 
& Teng, [3]; Reise, Waller, & Comrey, [40]). Stated otherwise, it is possible that items with similar distributions 
may tend to form factors irrespective of their item content. The p values of the 64 items in our combined 
dispositional reasoning measure varied (Mp = .61; SDp = 17; Minp = .20; Maxp = .93). 
 
Although some authors (e.g., Bandalos & Finney, [1]) argue that parceling should be reserved for conditions of 
unidimensionality, Little and colleagues ([ 32]) suggest two specific strategies for parceling items when item 
scores indicate a multidimensional factor structure. First, an internal consistency approach creates parcels that use 
the facets observed as grouping criteria. In this approach, items contained within a facet are clustered to form a 
combined item parcel, yielding internally consistent facets as manifest indicators of the higher stratum construct 
and keeping the multidimensional nature of the construct explicit. Second, the domain‐representative approach is 
a method that creates parcels by joining items from different facets into combined item clusters. For example, a 
parcel would contain items from each facets identified through dimensionality analysis. So, each parcel reflects all 
of the facets present within a set of items—this solution accounts for the multidimensionality inherent in a set of 
items. The domain representation approach has shown to be superior in some studies (e.g., Kishton & Widaman, 
[26]). Finally, a random item assignment strategy may be used. We decided to utilize random item assignment as 
a parceling strategy, as it recognizes the possibility that difficulty factors may cause spurious dimensions within 
each component of dispositional reasoning. We also ran the analyses using the two other parceling strategies—the 
choice of parceling strategy had no substantive effect on the final results. 
 
Footnotes 
1 Psychology students represent an important group of assessors in our study, given that they are normally trained 
as psychologist assessors. 
2 Some manager respondents (n = 146) were also included in another study investigating the criterion‐related 
validity of dispositional reasoning scores (De Kock et al., 16). 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
4 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the fundamental meaning of our invariance tests for factor loadings 
would have been clearer if we had used individual test items, rather than item parcels. 
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